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OF A JUST LAW
By Susan L. Waysdorf*
"I will . . . establish a tribunal, a tribunal to endure
for all time . . . " '
"Law has been threatened by the disintegration of
the public values in the larger society, and its future
can only be assured by the reversal of those social
processes. In order to save the law we must look
beyond the law .... The analytical arguments
wholly internal to the law can take us only so far.
There must be something more - a belief in public
values and the willingness to act on them."2
* J.D., University of Maryland School of Law; A.B.,
University of Chicago. The author has been a social activist
since the 1960s, when she was a member of the People's Law
Office collective. In recent years, she has been active in
support of political prisoners in the U.S., the campaign and
lawsuit to close the Lexington Control Unit, and the defense
of the Resistance Conspiracy case. Ms. Waysdorf is a recipient
of a Skadden Arps fellowship for 1991-93. She is a staff at-
torney at the Whitman-Walker Clinic's AIDS Legal Services
Project, in Washington, D.C. This article was first presented
by the author at a Law and Literature seminar led by
Professor Robin West at The University of Maryland Law
School during the fall of 1989. The author is particularly
grateful to Robin West for her encouragement and support.
Great appreciation is also due to Mary K. O'Melveny, Richard
Boldt, and the editors of LAW & LIBERATION for their com-
ments and encouragement of this project.
1. Athena, quoted in EUMENIDES by Aeschylus, as cited by
David Luban, Some Greek Trials: Order and Justice in Homer,
Hesiod, Aeschylus and Plato, 54 TENN. L. REv. 279, 296
(1987).
2. Owen Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 14 (1986).
I Introduction
The current and historical realities of the U.S. legal
system are best characterized by the contradiction between
justice and order. Is this an irreparable rift? Have alter-
native forums for the pursuit of justice, contrary to the
entrenched and formal legal system, emerged from com-
munity, political, or academic initiatives? What have been
the social costs of the legal system's failure to deliver its
intended good - justice? What examples exist of altema-
tive justice systems from other countries and other times,
from which we can create a visionary mosaic of possibili-
ties towards a more just and ethical legal system? Is there
a role for the excluded voices of the oppressed and for
legal storytelling?
I intend to show in this article how legal storytelling,
in serving a concrete and quasi-legal function, can help us
to address these broader jurisprudential questions.3 The
goal is more than an academic exercise. Rather, this arti-
cle emerges from the dialogue, about diversity and the
role of public interest law, currently engaging many at
law schools across the country. This dialogue is itself part
of the process of developing morally effective and politi-
cally responsive lawyering for the next decade and be-
yond.
3. The term "legal storytelling" is taken from Richard
Delgado, Mari Matsuda and others, who form a sector of the
"Law and Literature" movement that focuses on the excluded
voices of the dispossessed and oppressed, the victims of social
injustice - those whose voices are not ordinarily allowed ex-
pression or validation within the formal legal system. See,
Symposium on Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073
(1989). Legal storytelling is the use of the narrative in legal
process - the otherwise silenced voices tell their own first-hand
stories of oppression and struggle.
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It is the contention of this article that legal story-
telling can provide the nexus between justice-seeking
values and the narrative form, within the context of more
traditional legal discourse. In this way, legal storytelling
can play a constructive role in mediating the tension
between justice and order, by drawing on the popularist
and community values of people in struggle with the legal
system. My central claim is that it is the social
responsibility of progressive lawyers, legal scholars,
teachers, and law students to help generate, develop and
nourish forums for legal storytelling and the public justice
values which they create and promote. By doing so, we
ourselves learn, while becoming better advocates and help-
ing to empower those silenced by the formal legal system.
Popular tribunals have served to relate
real life and struggle to the law itself,
through legal storytelling.
To the extent legal storytelling can provide more
than a humanistic gloss to the rigidly defined terrain of
thelegal system and the process of adjudication, it can
actually serve areal jurisprudential function. In fact, the
concept of legal storytelling has engendered one of the
most compelling and innovative methodologies in recent
times for changing the legal system from within, while
challenging it frontally, from without. As a methodology,
legal storytelling is also having an impact on legal
education, as shown by recent works embracing and
analyzing "narrative jurisprudence"'4 .
The premise that legal storytelling can actually play
a concrete jurisprudential function is illustrated by the
example of popular tribunals. 5 These tribunals have
served, both in this country and in other, more progressive
societies, to relate real life and struggle to the law itself,
through legal storytelling. Popular tribunals, and the strug-
gles out of which they arise, keep the pursuit of justice
alive within the current constructs of this unjust society.
They can be understood as examples of how "law is the
projection of an imagined future upon reality."6 Legal
4. See, Pedagogy of Narrative: A Symposium, 40 J. LEOAL
EDUC., Numbers 1&2 (Association of American Law Schools,
March/June 1990).
5. People's tribunals, or popular tribunals, are generally
speak-outs, gatherings to which people come to hear and to
give witness, to provide oral testimony, to chronicle stories of
oppression, to share common grievances, and perhaps to chart
common plans for resistance. They can take many different
forms, as the examples given in this paper will reflect: they
can be part of the actual justice system of a country, such as
the Cuban Popular Tribunals; they can be extra-judicial, but
officially sanctioned, emergency forums, such as the Nicara-
guan Popular Anti-Somocista Tribunals; or they can be com-
munity-initiated, informal gatherings, entirely independent of the
formal legal system, such as those which have occurred in the
U.S. However, they all share key features, perhaps most nota-
bly a level of informal, non-hierarchical structure, popular
participation, and testimony from the people themselves as the
centerpiece of the presentation.
6. Robert Cover, in Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J.
storytelling also has its own historical legacy in this coun-
try, most particularly in the 1960s, the lessons of which
are a background to the ideas presented in this article.
The contention here is that there is a significant
value to legal storytelling, as well as to the conscious and
organized promotion of this narrative form. Legal
storytelling may actually contribute to transforming and
humanizing the law, as well as the value system around
which and out of which the law operates. As a
progressive methodology, legal storytelling can provide a
vehicle to legal practitioners who refuse-to participate in a
system which silences the oppressed. By choosing instead
to support and help empower those whose voices are si-
lenced by the system, lawyers participate in reviving the
value and potential of the law itself. It follows that justice
might therefore be a more realizable goal.
It is my aim here to gain a clearer understanding of
the well-entrenched contradiction between justice and or-
der in the U.S. legal system, and how it is that the sys-
tem has become so divergent from, and antithetical to, the
true pursuit of justice.7 I intend to do this by first dis-
cussing the lessons from "people's lawyering" of the
1960s for the challenges facing legal practitioners, justices,
and legal academics today.
Second, I explore the jurisprudential constructs of
several legal scholars, including Owen Fiss, Mari Matsuda,
Robert Cover, Robin West, Richard Delgado, and David
Luban, and their arguments within the "interpretive de-
bate" of the "Law and Literature" movement, as applied
to the issue of justice versus order. Third, I will discuss
legal storytelling within this context, as an important mod-
el which gives expression to those voices ordinarily ex-
cluded from the legal system, and as a concrete way of
mediating the tension between order and justice.
Finally, I will compare and contrast models of
people's or popular tribunals from Cuba, Nicaragua, and
the United States, as effective examples of legal storytell-
ing and as alternative pursuits of justice. I will conclude
with the suggestion that within these examples of relative-
ly informal and alternative forums for legal storytelling
lies a compelling, and inherently empowering, critical
1601, 1605 (1986) argued that martyrdom, rebellion and revo-
lution are all alternative responses of groups that have "failed
to adjust to or accept domination while sharing a physical
space . . [and] are alternative responses when conditions
make such acts feasible, and when there is a willingness not
only to die but also to kill for an understanding of the norma-
tive future that differs from that of the dominating power."
My claim is that people's tribunals, as struggles for justice
outside the established bounds of the formal legal system, are
also valid examples which fall squarely within Cover's
definition of alternative responses to domination.
7. Robert Cover discussed the core of this contradiction in
the following way:
Thus, because law is the attempt to build future worlds,
the essential tension in law is between the elaboration of
legal meaning and the exercise of or resistance to the
violence of social control. "[Tlhere is a radical dichoto-
my between the social organization of law as power and
the organization of law as meaning."
Id. at 1602, note 2 (quoting Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982
Term - Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4,
18 (1983)).
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H. The 1960s: A "Jurisprudence of Insurgency"
The political and social struggles of the 1960s
clearly reflect the profound tension between justice and
order in this country. Social control has historically been
pursued by the government and power elites in order to
maintain order. Domestic social control has included the
suppression of rebellion and political organizing, the
regulation of "crime," containment of the oppressed, and
the maintenance of dominating cultural and political
forces, such as racism and sexism. All too often, the legal
system (and more particularly, the criminal justice system)
has played a direct role in maintaining social control.
"People's lawyers" of the 1960s and early 70s prac-
ticed a "jurisprudence of insurgency," along with those
activists from the movements for social change whom
they defended.8 These lawyers and legal workers directly
challenged the collaborative and repressive role of the
legal system. They supported tens of thousands of activists
who confronted state repression, U.S. counter-intelligence
forces, and the police and military. The experiences of
"people's lawyers" and legal workers shed light on the
choices they made, and the opposition they encountered,
while practicing a jurisprudence of insurgency.
These lawyers challenged the privileges of their pro-
fession. They broke ranks with the establishment by tak-
ing legal direction and political lessons from their activist
clients. These realities of the 1960s are the background to
the ideas presented here. That is, they are the context for
my concerns as a social activist and now lawyer-in-train-
ing, who believes that legal activism can be used as a
vehicle for social change.
Why then, if I believe that the law and legal system
can be used as a vehicle for social change, am I looking
outside of the traditional and formal system, to a model
which is not only alternative in purpose and form, but
also in content? First, there is a continuum upon which
public interest or civil libertarian activist/lawyers always
travel, to some degree or another, variously rejecting or
embracing the law and the legal system as it currently
exists.
This tension of seeing the law both as part of the
problem and as part of the solution has been succinctly
described by Professor Mari J. Matsuda:
There are times to stand outside the courtroom door
and say "this procedure is a farce, the legal system
is corrupt, justice will never prevail in this land as
long as privilege rules in the courtroom." There are
times to stand inside the courtroom and say "this is
a nation of laws, laws recognizing fundamental val-
ues of rights, equality and personhood." Some-
times . . . there is a need to make both speeches in
one day.9
8. The term "jurisprudence of insurgency" is borrowed from
Michael Tigar & Madeleine Levy, LAW AND THE RISE OF
CAPITALISM (1977).
9. Mari Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls, 11 WOMEN'S
RTs. L. REP. 7, 8 (1989).
Secondly, popular tribunals provide a forum for the
unheard and typically excluded voices of the oppressed
and the under-represented classes of U.S. society: women,
Black and other Third World people, lesbians and gay
men, prisoners, those affected by unemployment, substan-
dard housing, homelessness, AIDS, police brutality, politi-
cal repression, imprisonment and institutionalization. From
these voices, I believe we can and must better understand
the problems themselves, and the nature of the tension
between justice and order.
These are not voices of stereotypically passive vic-
tims. They are voices of the actors in the struggles against
racism, sexism, economic disparities, the AIDS plague, the
"drug war," and the endemic abuses of this society. As a
result, they are the parties who most often find themselves
up against, and trapped within, the legal system, most
notably the criminal justice system and its prisons. They
are also the same people who are increasingly locked out
of the formal legal system, though they are the most in
need of its protection and remedies. Consider, for exam-
ple, the fact that it has become increasingly difficult for
the poor and people of color to utilize the U.S. legal
system as a vehicle for achieving relief of oppression and
for seeking civil rights.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that forums such as
popular tribunals point us beyond the formal legal system
for alternate "understandings of the normative future that
differs from that of the dominant power."' ° This is the
case precisely because the dichotomy between justice and
order is a morally and socially unacceptable one, and be-
cause law is essentially political. As Robert Cover sug-
gested,
Some systems, especially religious ones, can perpet-
uate and even profit from a dichotomy between an
ideal law and a realizable one. But such a dichoto-
my has immense implications if built into the law.
In our own secular legal system, one must assume
this to be an undesirable development."
In this vein, another lesson of the 1960s is that alter-
native forums such as popular tribunals concretely apply
the participatory, narrative form of legal storytelling, in
the struggle for justice. "Let the people speak," "giving
witness," "testimony of the oppressed," "voices from be-
hind the walls" - all of these phrases are descriptive of
a conception and a vision, coined in the 1960s, of
"people's justice." In the 1960s, "people's justice" was not
found in the courts; it was not particularly pursued in the
courts. "People's justice" was sought when justice could
not be achieved within the legitimate channels of the legal
system - in the streets, community forums, sit-ins, pro-
test marches, speak-outs, strikes. For radical lawyers,
struggling for people's justice, and practicing a jurispru-
dence of insurgency, sometimes resulted in their being
held in contempt of court. 2 At times, the struggle to
10. Cover, 95 YALE L.J. at 1605 (cited in note 6).
11. Id. at 1617.
12. The term "contempt of court" is itself illustrative of my
claim. In the introduction to LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE: Es-
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have the activist-client's story be heard in the courtroom
became a vehicle for forging power and building a move-
ment.
In the 1960s, the Black civil rights movement, the
anti-war and student movements, the Black rebellions
which rocked hundreds of urban centers, the emergence of
organizations for national liberation among Black, Puerto
Rican, Chicano and Native American peoples, -the insur-
gent women's movement, the prisoners' rights movement,
and the radical legal comunity which supported these
movements, together presented one of the greatest chal-
lenges in U.S. history to the American legal system.
These movements and their participants have many lessons
to share, many stories to tell. 3
Today, the movements of the 1960s have been effec-
tively de-mobilized by, along with government-exacerbated
internal factors, state repression and counter-insurgency
strategies, most notably the FBI's Counter-Insurgency Pro-
gram (COINTELPRO).' 4 This counterinsurgency strategy
SAYS TO DEMYSTIFY LAW, ORDER AND THE COURTS (1971),
Robert Lefcourt describes an interesting historical example of
this phenomena:
When during the 1969 Chicago Eight Conspiracy trial,
the lawyers for these "political and cultural dissidents"
joined with their clients to protest the use of an uncon-
stitutional riot statute to suppress dissent, the racism of
the court in denying Bobby Scale the right to his own
lawyer and the politically repressive role of the court in
denying all the defendants their right to fully present
their defense, they were charged with contempt and sen-
tenced to prison. William Kunstler's statement .. . [was]
an affirmation that the lawyer is a citizen whose
grievances must be heard.
13. The legal struggles of the 1960s - radical lawyering, the
National Lawyers Guild and "people's law" communes, such as
the New York Law Commune and the People's Law Office in
Chicago-could in themselves be the subject of many studies,
books, and articles. For an insightful and exciting overview of
the radical legal movement of the 1960s, see, LAW AGAINST
THE PEOPLE: ESSAYS TO DEMYSTIFY LAW, ORDER AND THE
COURTS (cited in note 12). Another passage from Robert
Lefcourt's introduction is worth quoting at length. Here, he
discusses the insurgencies of the 1960s, the significance of the
historical moment and the role of "People's Courts" and
"People's Justice":
All the lawyers contributing to this book . . . agree,
as does a growing proportion of the population, that the
legal system, like the system of education, the health
and military establishments, and the political process it-
self, is collapsing and can no longer be saved in its
present form. The process of radical change is not, as
some would argue, devoid of direction. Continual
challenge, such as periodic prison revolts, lawyer pro-
tests, and bail abolition demonstrations, cause confusion
and disorder which can lead to a new order. The idea
of People's Courts, as practiced in socialist countries, is
one way of altering existing power relationships within
the legal apparatus. Overall the institutions which only
pay lip service to democracy, to people's needs, and to
the survival of the planet will have to be taken over
and transformed by those who have been excluded from
and oppressed by their operation, that is, the majority of
the people.
14. For readings on COINTELPRO and government repres-
sion during the 1960s and beyond, see the following sources:
Ward Churchill & Jim VanderWall, AGENTS OF REPRESSION:
THE FBI's SECRET WARS AGAINST THE BLACK PANTHER PAR-
was complemented by daily police repression in Third
World communities, and the cumulative, embattling effects
of a reactionary legal system. As a result of state repres-
sion against the Black liberation movement, as well as the
Puerto Rican, Native American and Chicano-Mexicano
struggles, many activists were killed and hundreds of
others imprisoned. This could not have been accomplished
without the full complicity of the U.S. legal system.
Now, several decades later, many convicted under
the government's repressive strategies of the 1960s still
remain imprisoned as political prisoners. While the legal
system is no less unresponsive to the increasingly
marginalized sectors of the oppressed, the ranks of
"people's lawyers" have dramatically decreased. The need
for responsible lawyering is a critical one, and a serious
issue facing the legal profession today. A critical look at
the U.S. legal system today still requires intense scrutiny
of the underlying social and political system.
As radical lawyer/activist and now law professor Mi-
chael Tigar wrote almost two decades ago, "fundamental
change is necessary to fulfill claims to social justice.""3
The ideological conception of people's justice, for those
of us who are still (or newly) committed and sensitized to
these issues today, has meaning and purpose in relation to
the demands and felt needs, the realities and conditions of
life itself for the oppressed. The need not only to find an
outlet for the excluded voices, but to reach justice and to
find relief, is no less pressing today.
III.. Justice v. Order: An Irreparable Rift?
As noted, the U.S. legal system has to some lesser
or greater degree always been an instrument for social
control, that is, the maintenance of social order, of class,
racial and gender hierarchies. In more recent years, this
status quoism has clearly come to mean stark conserva-
tism, reaction, a full, no-holds-barred turning back of legal
gains won by the Civil Rights Movement and the
Women's Movement, in particular. In addition, the
marginalized and under-represented are increasingly pre-
vented from seeking redress or airing their grievances in
the courts. 6
TY AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT (South End Press
1988); Roy Wilkins & Ramsey Clark, SEARCH AND DESTROY:
A REPORT BY THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE BLACK
PANTHERS AND THE POLICE (Metropolitan Applied Research
Center, 1973); Brian Glick, WAR AT HOME: COVERT ACTION
AGAINST U.S. ACTIVISTS AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT
(South End Press 1989); Michael Deutsch, The Improper Use
of the Federal Grand Jury: An Instrument for the Internment
of Political Activists, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1159
(1984); Assata Shakur, ASSATA: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (Law-
rence Hill Press 1987); George Jackson, SOLEDAD BROTHER:
THE PRISON LETTERS OF GEORGE JACKSON (Coward McCann
1970); Ward Churchill & Jim VanderWall, THE COINTELPRO
PAPERS (South End Press 1990).
15. M. Tigar, Socialist Law and Legal Institutions, in LAW
AGAINST THE PEOPLE (cited in note 12).
16. These values are also clearly reflected in the legal pro-
fession itself, in legal education, and among today's law stu-
dents. See, e.g., High Pay Draws 1989 Graduates to Big
Firms, Enlistment for Public Interest, Government Jobs Drops,
New York Law Journal, June 8, 1989; Out of 11,000, 243
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Perhaps nothing speaks to this development more
clearly than the dismaying reality of the Supreme Court
today. Even the relative advances of the 1950s and 1960s
have been virtually shattered in recent terms. By restrict-
ing the rights of women to reproductive choice and abor-
tion,"7 and by virtually destroying affirmative action and
the effectiveness of the Civil Rights Acts,' 8 the Supreme
Court has clearly allied itself with white racism and mi-
sogyny.
The specter, and indeed sure prospect, of civil un-
rest, social violence and the upset of established social
and economic hierarchies has traditionally motivated the
Court to set the priority of order, rather than the priority
of justice.'9 The point is that the U.S legal system has
become truncated in purpose, turned on its head, a virtual
sham. 'Upholding the norms and social values once
thought to have been intrinsic to the ideal of social justice
is just not the central value motivating the U.S. courts
today.
20
Some of the theoretical constructs which have
emerged from the Law and Literature, Legal Storytelling
and Narrative Jurisprudence movements provide useful
mechanisms for examining this contradiction between
justice and order. Professor David Luban has used Greek
mythology as a vehicle to argue that there is a fundamen-*
tal conflict between justice and order. As other pro-
gressive thinkers in legal academia today, Professor Luban
suggests that the formal legal system is essentially an
instrument for maintaining social stability, order, and con-
Went Into Public Interest From The Top Schools, National
Law Journal, August 8, 1988.
17. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct. 3040
(1989).
18. See, Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S.Ct. 2115
(1989) (statistical evidence of racial disproportionality in em-
ployment promotional policy not enough to establish a prima
facie case of disparate impact violating Title VII); City of
Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 109 S.Ct. 706 (1989)
(Richmond's minority set-aside program not justifiable or nec-
essary to remedy effects of past discrimination); Martin v.
Wilks, 109 S.Ct. 2180 (1989) (white city employees not barred
by earlier failure to intervene, from challenging affirmative ac-
tion decrees); Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 109 S.Ct.
2363 (1989) (42 U.S.C. §1981 only applies to racial discrimi-
nation in the making and enforcement of contracts, not to the
conditions of employment). The Civil Rights Act of 1990, re-
cently vetoed by President Bush, was, in part, a legislative
response to these judicial setbacks.
19. Cases in which the Supreme Court has set the priority
of order over justice are best exemplified by Brown v. Board
of Education ("Brown I"), 349 U.S. 294 (1955), in which the
Court cut back on its initial decision in Brown v. Board of
Education ("Brown I"), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20. The term "social justice" is used in this essay to mean
not the administration of the institutionalized, formal legal
system, but rather the values of equity, impartiality and fair-
ness, to resolve conflicting social claims and unequal distribu-
tions of power as they affect peoples' lives. In this sense,
.social justice" is a principle and an ideal, not an institutional
mechanism. However, justice has been achieved at different
times and in different places, including within the legal system
in the U.S. It is righteousness and truth; sometimes it comes
in the form of redemption or even retribution. It can be a rec-
tifying of wrongs. As this definition stems from a popular
notion of justice, the terms "popular justice" or "people's
justice" also define this same principle.
trol. Arguing "in favor of justice rather than order as the
more central value realized by a good legal system,"'" he
contends that equity and justice should be the objects of a
truly just system.
Peace without justice is not true -peace at
all.
Despite the ancient Greek context of his article,
Luban's interest in the conflict is not merely historical.
"[F]or the tension between law as an instrument of order
(which may be achievable only at the expense of justice)
and law as an upholder of justice (which may have to be
purchased at the cost of social instability or dislocation) is
of enormous contemporary importance." 22 It is precisely
this perspective and concern which makes Luban's critique
of the unrelenting tension between order and justice in the
legal' system so useful to today's progressive legal practi-
tioners and legal educators.
. In Luban's analysis of both ancient Greece and the
modem U.S., the pursuit of peace has become synony-
mous with the pursuit of social order. Yet, peace without
justice in a fundamentally unjust or hierarchical society is
not true peace at all. 23 "Stability," argues Luban, "with-
out legal justice 'is quite literally impossible," for unless
justice is the primary and central value of a legal system,
then civil peace and "sociability will ultimately be unat-
tainable. ' 2 4 Drawing on his analogy to ancient Greece,
Luban notes that "institutions of justice exist (paradoxical-
ly) to stabilize a society rather than to do justice. "25
Consider the implications for a society in which "[t]he
purpose of the court is not to administer legal justice in
an absolute sense, but to transform malignant persuasion
into benign persuasion in the name of social peace.,
26
Indeed the costs of this sham are enormously and
perhaps immeasurably high. By analogy, Luban notes that
in the ORESTEIA, "in the name of prosperity and peace, an
unjust verdict converts women into a permanent
underclass of society . . . For Aeschylus, the price of
order is that we abandon legal justice in favor of social
control."" In the contemporary context, this legal/social
dilemma inevitably raises profound ethical and profession-
al responsibility issues for lawyers. As Luban points out,
lawyers today are in fact required by the American Bar
Association Code of Professional Responsibility to pro-
mote this sham. 2 "Suppose," Luban suggests, "a lawyer
21. Luban, 54 TENN. L. REv. at 284 (cited in note 1).
22. Id. at 281.
23. It is worth noting that Luban's analysis is consistent
with the slogan of the Black community in New York City in
the struggle against police brutality and racist attacks. From
Howard Beach, Queens in 1987 to Brooklyn in August, 1989,
the demand of the Black community has been "No JUSTICE,
No PEACE!"
24. Luban, 54 TENN. L. REV. at 294 (cited in note 1).
25. Id. at 321.
26. Id. at 311.
27. Id: at 313.
28. Id. at 321 (quoting from the Model Code of Professional
5
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is convinced that the legal system does not deserve confi-
dence, that it is profoundly corrupt; it sounds as though
the lawyer could be disciplined for making these suspi-
cions too public."29
Finally, Luban argues, the "human cost of
renouncing the quest for justice,"3 ° and abandoning
justice for stability, involves the entrenchment of
hierarchies and the furtherance of dominant interests. (In
Aeschylus' ORESTEIA this inevitibly leads to the further
subjugation of the Furies/all-women.) By contrast, Luban's
hero, Hesiod, "unlike Aeschylus or Plato [or Homer], is
writing from the standpoint of the victim."3' In this way,
Luban concludes by projecting a significant role for legal
storytelling in empowering and giving expression to
excluded voices. He also raises the ethical proposition that
lawyers should help promote legal storytelling.
One can scarcely overstress the importance of this
fact. The defining fact about legal institutions that
do not do justice is that they create innocent vic-
tims ... reconciliation often only means that the
victim has silently swallowed his injury .... Once
we determine to make justice a genuine goal for an
open society ... the victim's is the standpoint we
can no longer ignore.32
IV. The Law As Deliverer of Justice: A Dream De-
ferred?
Importantly, the pursuit of social justice has not al-
ways been absent from the process of judicial decision-
making in this country. Certainly the early civil rights
decisions, best reflected in the initial Brown v. Board of
Education,33 which gave life to the Reconstruction-era
Amendments, are a compelling expression of this. The
notion that the "people" themselves have a role to play in
the determination, distribution and deliverance of justice
within the formal and legitimized adjudicatory legal sys-
tem, lends some depth to the meaning of social or popular
justice. It has seen some, if minimal and impermanent,
reality.
The constitutional right to a jury trial of one's peers
is another clear manifestation of this notion. "It is part of
the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments
of public justice that the jury be a body truly representa-
tive of the community."' "Our notions of what a proper
jury is have developed in harmony with our basic con-
cepts of a democratic society and a representative gov-
ernment." 35 As recently as 1975, the Court held that a
Responsibility, Canon 9 and EC 9-1 (1979)): "Continuation of
the American concept that we are to be governed by rules of
law requires that people have faith that justice can be obtained
through our legal system. A lawyer should promote public
confidence in our system and in the legal profession."
29. Luban, 54 TENN. L. REv. at 321 (cited in note 1).
30. Id. at 324.
31. Id. at 324.
32. Id. at 324.
33. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
34. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
35. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85 (1942).
state jury system could not systematically exclude women
from jury service, while stating in significant dicta that:
The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exer-
cise of arbitrary power - to make available the
commonsense judgement of the community as a
hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor
and in preference to the professional or perhaps
overconditioned or biased response of a judge [cite
omitted]. This prophylactic vehicle is not provided if
the jury pool is made up of only special segments
of the populace or if large, distinctive groups are
excluded from the pool. Community participation in
the administration of the criminal law, moreover, is
not only consistent with our democratic heritage but
is also critical to public confidence in the fairness of
the criminal justice system. 6
Professor Owen Fiss has similarly advocated the no-
tion that law itself is a public ideal, in that law arises
from and reflects the values of the community. Fiss is
critical of both the right and the left, that is, both the
Law and Economics movement and the Critical Legal
Studies movement, for uniting "in their rejection of the
notion of law as public ideal . . . [N]either is willing to
take law on its own terms, and to accept adjudication as
an institutional arrangement in which public officials seek
to elaborate and protect the values that we hold in com-
mon."
37
Although Fiss readily recognizes that the legal
system today is remiss in its mission to uphold society's
values, he is critical of the two schools insofar as they
give us nowhere to go. Because he is sympathetic to the
egalitarianism of the Critical Legal Studies movement, he
is particularly disturbed by its nihilism, its negative pur-
pose. By way of his objective interpretivist analysis,
which rests on a view of judges as being members of a
legal "interpretive community," Fiss argues for an
affirmative vision, albeit an idealistic one, of the judiciary
and the law. 8
Professor Robin West largely rejects Fiss's
36. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
37. Fiss, 72 CoRNELL L. REv. at 2 (cited in note 2).
38. Fiss's arguments are utilized for the purposes of this
paper primarily as a useful critique of the nihilism and cyni-
cism of the Critical Legal Studies movement on the one hand,
and the mechanistic instrumentalism, conservatism and reaction
of the Law and Economics movement on the other. Beyond
this, however, Fiss's own views, or at least his earlier views,
can be seen as too idealistic. His ultimate reliance on the
written word of the law as an adequate reflection of morality
simply doesn't work in this highly political and divided soci-
ety. In this sense, I join with the claims of the Critical Legal
Studies movement that "law is politics." In this country, so
dangerously divided by classism, racism and sexism, there is
no one set of "community values," as Fiss claims. The law
and most judges have always represented the status quo and
certain dominant interests. When judges set opinions, and inter-
pret the law, they are giving their political and social views of
the case before them. For further discussion of the subjective
and objective interpretist schools, see also, Stanley Fish, Is
THERE A TEXT IN THis CLAss? (1980); and Owen Fiss, Ob-
jectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739 (1982).
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"Objective Interpretivism" approach.39 She criticizes his
idealist view of the law as a reflection of "community
values," while re-stating the interpretive debate within the
context of modern-day realities and contradictions.
Professor West argues, "South Africa, Nazi Germany,
Stalinist Russia, and the slave-holding South, if nothing
else, have taught us that there is no moral guarantee in
the idea of law."" Indeed, it gives false comfort to
suggest that there is one unified and egalitarian set of
communal values in the socially and politically torn
United States.
Perhaps West is warning us riot to fall easy prey to
the righteous-sounding optimism of the "law as ideal" or
the enticing warmth of Fiss's "community" notion. Legal
and social activists, while looking for a vision to embrace,
and stymied by the Critical Legal Studies movement's
lack of direction and solution, can be misled by this rhet-
oric. In calling Fiss's objective interpretivism analysis a
"justificatory illusion,"4 ' West argues that to blur the dis-
tinction between the "law" that is and the moral ideal that
ought to be reveals the irresponsibility of "viewing legal
analysis as either an objective or subjective interpretive
act." 2
For in fact, West argues, the so-called "disciplining
rules" which presumably hold the judiciary within the
bounds of the "interpretive community's" morals, are es-
sentially as disturbing as the nihilism Fiss is reacting to.
West notes that Fiss's position is "marred by an undue
optimism regarding community."43 She puts this debate
into contemporary reality.
Moral relativism is no alternative to the moral nihil-
ism Fiss fears in subjectivism. The claim that it is, I
think, rests upon an optimism regarding "communi-
ty" and more specifically our own historical commu-
39. Robin West, Adjudication Is Not Interpretation: Some
Reservations About the Law-As-Literature Movement, 54 TENN.
L. REV. 203 (1987).
40. Id. at 214.
41. Id. at 210.
42. Id. at 209.
43. Id. at 219. For further critique of Fiss's analysis, see,
Paul Brest, Comment on Fiss: Interpretation and Interest, 34
STAN. L. REV. 765, 770 (1982). In raising doubts about the
clear-cut and normative role which Fiss assigns to the Supreme
Court, Brest cannot concur with Fiss's neutral view of the
"interpretive community," nor its methods of "constitutional
interpretation." Brest argues, "When combined with the au-
thoritativeness of legal interpretation, the demographic composi-
tion of our 'interpretive community' presents normative prob-
lems in a democratic polity. The members of the legal inter-
pretive community are mostly white, male, professional, and
relatively wealthy. However humble their backgrounds, they are
members of a ruling elite." Brest at 770-771. Troubled by the
social basis for his own and Fiss's "commitment to the rule of
law," Brest suggests that some honest introspection is called
for. "I wonder whether our committment to the rule of law, as
to other 'public values,' is not related to our relatively fortu-
nate status within this society." Brest at 772. Brest states, "the
line separating law from politics is not all that distinct and
that its very location is a question of politics. I do not think
this is nihilism." Brest at 773. In contrast, popular tribunals, as
discussed in this article, avoid the problems of "demographic
composition" described by Brest, as by definition they are
judges and juries of peers.
nity, which is simply unwarranted. Surely, from the
perspective of those most in need of the law's pro-
tection - slaves, women, workers, children, the
poor, the illiterate, the uneducated, dissidents and
other members of that vast and silenced majority
whom the "community" in its relative moral wisdom
has at one time or another cast off - a relativism
that ties justice to community norms and practices is
as odious and even frightening as the "nihilism" Fiss
imagines he sees in the deconstructive instincts of
his opponents."4
Despite the inherent limitations and abstractions in
Fiss's arguments, his theory inspires hope for the future.
It is noteworthy that Fiss looks to the women's movement
for a vision of that future. He concludes by arguing
against traditional gender values and female subjugation
(in the name of justice), in much the same way Luban
concludes his essay which interprets the Greek trials. In
fact, Luban recognizes that Fiss is with him in the camp
favoring justice over peace.4" Fiss's hope for the future
of the law, his insistance that law can still represent social
ideals, is shown by his strong support for the feminist
legal critics. Feminists, Fiss argues, are unmasking the
law, and struggling for a "critique ... aimed at freeing
law from the past."
4 6
They, like the realists [of the 20's and 30's], are
moved by an affirmative vision - if not liberty,
then a true and substantive equality - and they
appreciate how the law can be used to further that
vision. But that is not critical legal scholarship ....
Critical legal studies scholars are distinguished (if at
all) from feminists and the legal realists of an earli-
er generation by the purity of their negativism.47
Fiss's argument, even if overly idealistic, is thus
nonetheless compelling. In particular, his vision is ap-
44. West, 54 TENN. L. REV. at 218-219 (cited in note 39).
Fiss himself, moreover, appears to question whether his posi-
tion is somewhat overly optimistic. The following is from
Fiss's The Death of the Law?, 72 CoRNELL L. REV. at 11-12
(cited in note 2).
In this account of adjudication I recognize that I am
making an empirical assumption about the richness of
the legal system in a country such as the United States.
I am assuming that our legal culture is sufficiently de-
veloped and textured so as to yield a body of disciplin-
ing rules that constrains judges and provides the stan-
dards for evaluating their work. This assumption is, of
course, open to a factual challenge, as any empirical
claim must be. Indeed, I advanced this theory a few
years ago, and nowadays I wonder whether I am mistak-
en in making this assumption and whether I am guided
more by a duty to see the best in life rather than by a
tough assessment of the facts. The proponents of critical
legal studies are not, however, prepared to disagree with
me on these (mundane) terms. For their claim is...
rather that law, by its nature, can never provide the
constraint needed to achieve objectivity. Their idea is
not that there are no right answers, but rather that there
can never be a right answer.
45. Luban, 54 TENN. L. REV. at 282 (cited in note 1).
46. Fiss, 72 CoRNELL L. REV. at 9 (cited in note 2).
47. Id. at 9.
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pealing because it reflects a less cynical and more
optimistically egalitarian view of human nature and the
potential for the pursuit of justice.4" In fact, Fiss's
analysis is fueled by a vision of the 60s, when "we were
drawn to law as public ideal, [while] in the next decade
we took refuge in the politics of selfishness."49 Despite
my disagreements with Fiss's reliance on the word of the
law and his belief in a singular and representative com-
munity morality, this vision of "the 60s" is a compelling
one. The notion is in fact central to sustaining a belief
that law can be salvaged and utilized as a vehicle for
social change.
Finally, to Fiss it is not surprising that both the Crit-
ical Legal Studies movement and the conservative Law
and Economics movement sprang up out of the decade of
the 1970s, where "[t]he prospect of understanding and
nourishing a common morality seemed hopeless."5 ° For
in fact, argues Fiss, "[b]oth movements can be understood
as a reaction to a jurisprudence, confidently embraced by
the bar in the sixties, that sees ajudication as the process
for interpreting and nurturing a public morality.""' Fiss
himself counters hopelessness because he is sustained by
this "historical vision - by remembering the 1960s and
the role that the law, and specifically the Warren Court,
played in the struggle for racial equality."
52
Who, if anyone will carry on this legacy? Where do
we look for justice to be delivered? Can law itself be
appreciated as a generative force of our public life, as
Fiss contends? Is it realistic or fair (to the women's
movement) to look to the women's movement and femi-
nism, as Fiss suggests, to fulfill the dream of the 1960s?
For indeed, what is needed is a social force that will be
"the instrument of social regeneration the law
awaits[.] ... Beyond that, it is difficult to know how a
belief in public values might be regenerated."
53
48. See also, Owen Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34
STAN. L. REV. at 750 (cited in note 38). Professor Fiss claims
that "Viewing adjudication as interpretation helps to stop the
slide towards nihilism. It makes law possible ...I have ex-
plained how objective interpretation becomes possible in the
law, even if it is not possible in literature."
Decidedly more optimistic in this earlier work, Fiss relies
on the law as the ideal. He steadfastly espouses his own
"commitment to the rule of law" and more specifically, the
Constitution itself. In this work, Fiss concludes: "My defense
of adjudication as objective interpretation, however, assumes
that the Constitution has some meaning - more specifically,
that the text embodies the fundamental public values of our
society." 34 STAN. L. REv. at 762-763. This is precisely the
framework that Paul Brest critiques in Interpretation and In-
terest, 34 STAN. L. REv. 765. (cited in note 43).
49. Fiss, 72 CORNELL L. REV. at 14 (cited in note 2).
50. Id. at 14. See also, Fiss's discussion of this issue in
Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. at 741 (cited
in note 38). "The nihilism of today is largely a reaction to
this reconstructive effort of the sixties."
51. Fiss, 72 CORNELL L. REV. at 14 (cited in note 2).
52. Id. at 14-15.
53. Id. at 15.
V. Popular Tribunals: "Legal Storytelling" As a Crit-
icism of the Law
To criminalize the telling of any story is to
silence that voice. 4
It is perhaps precisely because "[l]aw is a product of
power"" that alternative forums for seeking justice arise
out of grassroots struggles for self-determination, and
against racism, sexism and classism. As a forum that is
explicitly built on the use of the narrative or legal story-
telling - the voices of the oppressed, those typically
excluded from the hallowed courts of the formal legal
system - popular tribunals are an alternative model for
the pursuit of justice, although incomplete and insufficient
in themselves as a permanent or long-term solution.
Both the concept of popular tribunals, and their con-
crete manifestations by communities in struggle, serve as
useful counterpoints to the traditional legal system's al-
most complete rejection of the narrative form. By simple
juxtaposition, the tribunal highlights the reality that the
U.S. legal system has become separate from and even
counter to the pursuit of justice, while it has become
increasingly a tool of social control.
As a forum that is explicitly built on the
use of the narrative - the voices of the
oppressed - people's tribunals are an
alternative model for the pursuit of jus-
tice.
The claim that people's tribunals are themselves a
criticism of the law is consistent with the fact that the
very need for people's tribunals is based on a recognition
that fundamental social and political change is necessary
in order to truly achieve justice. In other words, inherent
in the existence of popular tribunals, is an underlying
criticism of the law, and of the legal system. By partici-
pating in, witnessing or even acknowledging the need for
such tribunals, we are forced to recognize the failures of
the legal system, as well as its role as a vehicle for social
control. Conversely, if the formal system of adjudication
provided justice, there would be no need for popular tri-
bunals and for legal storytelling. These alternative forums
stem from a recognition that law is a product of power,
and therefore must be met, with power, by a new vision.
As Professor West argues:
By focusing on the distinctively imperative core of
adjudication, instead of its interpretive gloss, we free
up meaningful criticism of law. Adjudication, like all
of law, is imperative - it is a part of politics ....
54. Toni Masaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling and the Law:
New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073, 2109
(1989).
55. West, 54 TENN. L. REV. at 277 (cited in note 39).
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The criticism of law ... cannot be grounded in yet
another interpretation of what is. It must rest on a
claim regarding that which ought to be, not a claim
regarding that which is, or how power has been
used to date. It must be grounded in the text we
didn't write - the text of our natural needs, our
true potential, our utopian ideals.56
As long as we exist in an unjust social and political sys-
tem, wherein the formal adjudication process is played out
on the "field of pain and death,"57 popular tribunals will
find their source in such "meaningful criticism." As such,
they are themselves a criticism of the law and a part of
the text of our "utopian ideals."
An essential feature of people's tribunals, whether in
post-revolutionary Nicaragua and Cuba, or those stemming
from grassroots struggles in the United States, is that the
people themselves, usually the victims of social injustice,
are the main players. They speak witness, weave oral
histories and tell the stories of their oppression and their
struggles. They share with those gathered an indictment of
the forces who have wronged them - whether it is the
police, a welfare agency, the U.S. military, an employer,
the FBI, or the Ku Klux Klan.
This process is self-regenerating. In other words, the
struggle to speak out is itself an empowering process,
producing a strengthening of voices. These groups are
what Professor Richard Delgado calls "outgroups, groups
whose marginality defines the boundaries of the main-
stream, whose voice and perspective - whose conscious-
ness - has been suppressed, devalued, and
abnormalized."5' The "outgroups" of contemporary Amer-
ica include welfare mothers, pro-Choice advocates, AIDS
activists and people who are HIV positive, homeless peo-
ple, victims of police brutality, Black people struggling
against racism, Central American sanctuary workers, tar-
gets of the political police (FBI), prisoners, people acting
in solidarity against U.S. policies in Central America and
South Africa.
These typically under-represented sectors are the po-
tential participants in today's popular tribunals. They are
the creators of legal storytelling, and they put it into prac-
tice. Yet their forums are not courtrooms. Ordinarily in
opposition to the established powers and the legal system,
these are communities of people in struggle. Their oral
presentations "create their own bonds, represent cohesion,
shared understandings, and meanings."59
Professor Delgado argues that legal storytelling
56. Id. at 278.
57. Cover, 95 YALE L.J. at 1607 (cited in note 6).
58. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and
Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411, 2412
(1989). See also, Derrick Bell, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED
(Basic Books 1987); Mar J. Matsuda, Public Response to
Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L.
REv. 2320 (1989); Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreward: Telling
Stories, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073 (1989); David Luban, Differ-
ences Made Legal: The Court and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L.
REv. 2152 (1989); and Robert Cover, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTI-
SLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975).
59. Delgado, 87 MIC. L. REv. at 2412 (cited in note 58).
serves several key purposes. By telling their stories, the
powerless and disenfranchised are empowered, for "[t]he
cohesiveness that stories bring is part of the strength of
the outgroup. " 6° They educate those of us who are not
immediately in their camp.
Stories, parables, chronicles, and narratives are pow-
erful means for destroying mindset - the bundle of
presuppositions, received wisdoms, and shared un-
derstandings against a background of which legal
and political discourse takes place. These matters are
rarely focused on. They are like eyeglasses we have
worn a long time .... Ideology - the received
wisdom - makes current social arrangements seem
fair and natural . . .The cure is storytelling (or as I
shall sometimes call it, counter-storytelling). As
Derrick Bell .. .and others show, stories can shat-
ter complacency and challenge the status quo.
6'
Not only can legal storytelling, or in my suggested
model, popular tribunals, challenge the status quo, empow-
er those who speak out, and educate those who will listen,
but they can serve a normative function as well. They
build community and shore up value systems in times of
oppression, disempowerment, and distress. Professor
Delgado has suggested:
... stories build consensus, a common culture of
shared understandings, and deeper, more vital ethics.
Counterstories, which challenge the received wisdom,
do that as well. They can open new windows into
reality, showing us that there are possibilities for life
other than the ones we live. They enrich imagination
and teach that by combining elements from the story
and current reality, we may construct a new world
richer than either alone. Counterstories can quicken
and engage conscience. Their graphic quality can stir
imagination in ways in which more conventional
discourse cannot.
6 2
Legal storytelling can help a group to construct a
shared reality. Speaking witness, by chronicling injustice,
can help the group to formulate goals and strategies, to
build a communal sense of outrage and to move people
towards collective action. In this way, tribunals can be
"[m]ore than just a narrative, [but rather] a call to action,
a call to join . . .in destroying the current story. 63
Storytelling is a form of healing, whereby
both the teller and the listener are
changed.
Furthermore, legal storytelling allows members of
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lessen "their own subordination. 64 Storytelling is
therefore a form of healing, whereby both the teller and
the listener are changed.
The storyteller gains psychically, the listener morally
and epistemologically .... By becoming acquainted
with the facts of their own historic oppression -
with the violence, murder, deceit, co-optation, and
connivance that have caused their desperate estate -
members of outgroups gain healing.65
The result, argues Delgado, need not necessarily be a vio-
lent call to action, but can be found in the realization
itself of "how one came to be oppressed and subjugated.
Then, one can stop perpetrating (mental) violence on one-
self."' Delgado sums up the impact of legal storytelling:
So stories - stories about oppression, about victim-
ization, about one's own brutalization - far from
deepening the despair of the oppressed, lead to heal-
ing, liberation, mental health. They also promote
group solidarity. Storytelling emboldens the hearer,
who may have had the same thoughts and experi-
ences the storyteller describes, but hesitated to give
them voice. Having heard another express them, he
or she realizes, I am not alone.67
Finally, legal storytelling helps oppressed groups be-
cause by communicating the story of struggle, the narrator
actually affects the oppressor, in certain circumstances.
The struggle to speak out is itself an em-
powering process.
Not only do willing listeners, in some circumstances,
enrich their own reality through re-education, but they
may also acquire the ability to see the world through the
other's eyes. "[S]hared words can banish sameness, stiff-
ness, and monochromaticity and reduce the felt terror of
othemess when hearing new voices for the first time."68
The result is that by "seeking out story tellers different
from ourselves and afford[ing] them the audience they
deserve," we all benefit, for stories humanize us.'
Indeed, as Professor Matsuda has argued, "[t]he
failure to hear the victim's story results in an inability to
give weight to competing values of constitutional dimen-
sion,"70 and in this way, serves to dangerously sustain
the violent status quo. Viewed in this light, it is important
to consider that lawyers have a social responsibility to
promote legal storytelling, by helping to create and partic-
64. Id. at 2436.
65. Id. at 2437.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2440.
69. Id.
70. Matsuda, 87 MICH. L. REv. at 2376 (cited in note 58).
ipate in forums such as popular tribunals. In so doing,
lawyers increase the empowerment of their clients. Law-
yers, as legal activists, can also help bring willing listen-
ers within range of the otherwise excluded and unheard
voices. Finally, lawyers can dramatically improve their
own lawyering by sensitizing themselves to the stories and
analysis expressed by their clients.
Professor Matsuda has called this form of lawyering
"Outsider Jurisprudence." 7 It has become an increasingly
significant school of contemporary legal thought, method-
ology and political action.
This method is consciously both historical and revi-
sionist, attempting to know history from the bottom.
From the fear and namelessness of the slave, from
the broken treaties of the indigenous Americans, the
desire to know history from the bottom has forced
these scholars to sources often ignored: journals,
poems, oral histories, and stories from their own
experiences of life in a hierarchically arranged
world. . . . This methodology, which rejects
presentist, androcentric, Eurocentric, and false-uni-
versalist descriptions of social phenomena, offers a
unique description of law. . . . It accepts the
standard teaching of street wisdom: law is essentially
political. It accepts as well the pragmatic use of law
as a tool of social change, and the aspirational core
of law as the human dream of peaceable exis-
tence.72
Precisely because law is essentially political, the
voices of the excluded, those whom we as lawyers
represent, or with whom we may work side by side in
community struggles, are our collective social conscience.
The voices of the excluded are our col-
lective social conscience.
They are a mirror of, perhaps a reminder of, our own
social responsibility, as we work within a fundamentally
unjust and largely immoral legal system. For indeed, "[i]t
is the narrative of social protest and moments of 'creative
tension' that reminds us of unkept promises and of the
moral emergency in which we live. 7
VI. Examples of Legal Storytelling: Popular Tribu-
nals in Cuba, Nicaragua and the United States Move-
ment in Support of Human Rights for Political Prison-
ers
Finally, legal storytelling is perhaps best explained
by example, that is, by telling a story about the
storytelling. As I have suggested throughout this essay,
popular tribunals are a practical application of collective
legal storytelling. In each of the following examples, a
71. Id. at 2323.
72. Id. at 2324.
73. Luban, 87 MICH. L. REv. at 2224 (cited in note 58).
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form of "outsider jurisprudence" has been utilized through
popular tribunals, to right a wrong, to express a grievance
otherwise untold, to move a group to action, and to
educate. They are at one and the same time similar to and
different from one another. In each of the following case
studies - the Popular Tribunals of early post-revolution-
ary Cuba, the Popular Anti-Somocista Tribunals in
contemporary revolutionary Nicaragua, and the tribunals
held in support of political prisoners in the United States
- a degree of people's justice has been won through
popular participation.
Cuban Popular Tribunals
The Cuban Popular Tribunals developed as, an
attempt to provide an alternative to the legal system
which revolutionary leader Fidel Castro, himself trained as
a lawyer, condemned as unresponsive and counter-
revolutionary. 4 These Popular Tribunals were in opera-
tion between approximately 1964 and 1974. They had
authority over lesser crimes, torts, juvenile delinquency
cases, domestic relations disputes and minor labor prob-
lems. These tribunals functioned within a non-adversarial
legal system, and in a newly socialist and egalitarian post-
revolutionary Cuban society. The Tribunals had many
purposes, but primarily they served to promote popular
participation in the legal-ethical redevelopment of the new
nation, They also served as a forum for popular education.
With the Cuban Revolution of 1959 came a transfor-
mation of Cuban society, which in turn had an almost
immediate transformative effect on its legal system. These
changes began with a series of fundamental revolutionary
laws passed between 1959 and 1963. These laws affected
the socio-economic relations of land-owning, schooling,
the expropriation and nationalization of Cuban banks and
U.S. corporate holdings, as well as agrarian reform.75
Underlying these legal changes were socialist principles.
These principles include the following jurisprudential
premise which underlies what the Cubans call socialist
legality:
,People acquire understanding and respect for the law
when they participate in the very formulation and
administration of the law, when they participate in
the Ver' formulation and administration of the legal
system.
The Cuban Popular Tribunals, utilizing a form of narrative
jurisprudence, participatory justice, and legal storytelling,
served this central function.
By the early 1970s, when the Cuban Revolution was*
entering a new stage of development, the Popular Tribu-
nals were no longer effectively serving their original pur-
pose. The Popular tribunals were for the most part dis-
74. Jesse Berman, The Cuban Popular Tribunals, 69 COLUM.
L. REV. 1317 (1969).
75. John Carro, The Structure of Legal Education and the
Practice of Law in Cuba, 94 REVISTA DE DERECHO
PUERTORRiQUEIO 89, 90 (1985).
76. Id. at 91 (quoting from Bias Roca, Bohemia, March 2,
1973).
mantled, with the ratification of the Cuban Constitution in
1976. At that point, institutionalization of the legal system
took place, and a more formal and regulated legal system,
still in operation today, was put in place."' Yet, these
early post-revolutionary Popular Tribunals, and the cre-
ative sanctions which they provided,78 left a legacy con-
cerning the role of narrative and participatory jurispru-
dence, in promoting normative values and the building of
community.
It is noteworthy that the Popular Tribunals had lay
judges who were not legally trained. These people's courts
were located in community storefronts, occurred only in
the evening after working hours, and encouraged total
public participation. In this way, the Popular Tribunals
were primarily a vehicle for popular education at a time
when a new morality was being developed, and the old
ideas and values of the Batista regime were being disman-
tled and replaced. They were intended to teach the Cuban
population the laws in general and the new laws in partic-
ular, "as Well as to instill in the people a revolutionary
consciousness and a socialist mentality." 9 Night after
night, the audience, the residents of the neighborhood
zona, packed the informal storefront courtrooms to hear
the stories of the disputes or crimes at issue, told in the
words of their neighbors. Often there were not enough
seats, and the crowd overflowed into the streets.
Based on his conversations with Cuban assessores,
77. For more readings on post-revolutionary and contempo-
rary Cuban legal system, see, Luis Salas, The Emergence and
Decline of the Cuban Popular Tribunals, 17 LAW & Soc'Y
REV. 587 (1983); Henry Dahl, The Use of Arbitration in Cu-
ba: International Solutions For The Resolution of Local Prob-
lems, 20 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 681 (1989); Luis
Salas, The Judicial System of Postrevolutionary Cuba, 8 NOVA
L.J. 43 (1983); Harold Berman & Van Whiting, Impressions of
Cuban Law, 28 AM. J. COMp. L. 475 (1980); Kennedy,
Cuba's Ley Contra La Vagrancia: The "Law on Loafing," 20
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1177 (1973); Debra Evenson, Economic
Regulation in Cuba: The State Arbitration System, 8 Loy. L.A.
INT'L. & CoMP. L.J. 371 (1986); Robert Cantor, New Laws for
a New Society, Cuba Resource Center Newsletter 3,5 & 6
(1973).
78. I note these sanctions here because they provide an im-
portant window on the Cuban Popular Tribunals. They are
noteworthy for their purely rehabilitative nature within the
context of the Cuban non-adversarial legal system.
Briefly, the sanctions were: (1) public admonition
(amonestacidn pdblica), in which the defendant would receive
a warning or lecture; (2) educational improvement (superacidn
educacional); (3) deprivation of rights (privacidn de derechos),
in which the person sanctioned was deprived of the same "so-
cial right" which the Tribunal found his conducta antisocial
had abused; (4) banishment from a specific place (alejamiento),
in which a drunkard might be prohibited from entering a par-
ticular tavern; (5). confinement to a specific place
(confinamiento), a relatively severe sanction reserved for those
who would have been incarcerated; (6) sanction of relocation
(reubicaci6n); (7) confiscation (decomismo) of the fruits or in-
strumentalities of the offense; (8) sanction of indemnification
(indemnizacidn), which was used primarily to indemnify a
victim for physical injuries; and (9) sanction of deprivation of
liberty (privacion de libertad), composed of internment, forcing
the defendant to live and work elsewhere for up to 180 days,
and non-internment (the doing of certain tasks). Berman, 69
CoLUM L. REV. at 1329-1331 (cited in note 74).
79. Id. at 1350.
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or revolutionary lawyers, as well as with spectators at the
tribunals, Jesse Berman concluded that the Popular Tribu-
nals played two interrelated purposes:
they "function in the neighborhood, so that neigh-
bors and acquaintances of those being judged can
attend the trials and can make these trials truly pub-
lic," and that the public trials "educate the new
man[,] ... secure the socialist laws" and "correct
those who still keep the customs of the old oppres-
sor society." [cites omitted] These ideas may be
capsulized as popular involvement and popular edu-
cation."
In some cases which Berman observed, the ultimate
in audience participation occurred: witnesses emerged
spontaneously from the audience to speak out in support
of or against their neighbor on trial. Sometimes, trials of
particular import were held out of doors in village plazas.
One case attracted as many as 5,000 persons in the town
of Nuevitas.8 ' This aspect has been criticized as being
reminiscent of a public execution, for, as Berman queried,
there "is some question as to whether all this popular in-
volvement may not be taken by the people more as enter-
tainment than as education."8" However, despite this ap-
parent fault, Berman concluded that "[a]s far as popular
involvement is concerned, the Popular Tribunals have met
with success both in theory and in practice." 3
Perhaps equally important, the Popular Tribunals pro-
vided a forum - narrative, familiar and unformidable in
form - for resolving disputes. Significantly, the forum
was available and accessible to all Cuban citizens, "no
matter how poor or uneducated,"" a dramatic change
from the prior regime. Finally, the Popular Tribunals
seemed to "be quite successful in reaching correct, fair re-
sults," that is, in administering justice."3 In this sense,
concluded Berman, the Cuban Popular Tribunals, although
perhaps not "especially original within the realm of the
socialist legal systems ... [came] close to being institu-
80. Id. at 1342.
81. Id. at 1343.
82. Id. at 1350.
83. Id. Berman goes on to observe that:
The Popular Tribunals meet in the evenings, when
all can attend the trials, which are virtually all public.
The judges are laymen from the neighborhood, and the
cases deal with essentially local problems ... Atten-
dance is high, with the crowds actually overflowing the
small courtrooms. The local residents view the Popular
Tribunals as something of their own, not as a mecha-
nism imposed on them from outside. At least some of
the "spontaneous" witnesses are truly spontaneous -
neighbors with personal knowledge of the case who
want to offer their cooperation .... there seems to be
general respect for the Tribunals among the people.
84. Id. at 1351.
85. Id. at 1352. According to Berman, the "prime consid-
eration in administering justice is that the results be correct -
that the facts be determined accurately enough to lead to a
verdict consistent with the equities of the case and to insure
that the sanctions imposed or the remedies granted be
appropriate."
tions which truly administer[ed] 'popular justice'."86
It is perhaps ironic that U.S. advocates of alternate
dispute resolution mechanisms have turned in increasing
numbers to study of the Cuban model, while the Cubans
have themselves moved away from the informality of the
Popular Tribunals "toward a system substantially more
like traditional Western lower courts." 7 Professor Luis
Salas has also chronicled the role of the Popular Tribu-
nals, as well as their decline. He has noted the events
which "marked the end of the popular courts and the
renewed institutionalization of the lowest level tribunals
within the judicial system."88
Within a few years, with the ratification of the new
Constitution in 1976, Cuba was well on its way toward
institutionalization of the Revolution as a whole. At that
point, the popular educational value of the Cuban tribunals
had become outdated. The change, Salas argues, was not
only sorely needed, but it revealed a striking trend toward
formalism and Cuban bureaucratization, in style as well as
substance.89 The Popular Tribunals, through their narrative
form and informal structure, had "embodied the vision of
how law should function that was held by [Ernesto Che]
Guevara and his followers."'
The demise of Guevarism in the late 1960s removed
the ideological underpinnings of these courts...'.
Ultimately, the issue for the Cubans was how this
reform related to long-term revolutionary
goals[.] . . .The most important of the goals [was]
integrating the citizenry into the changing
postrevolutionary order and, more generally, of so-
cializing people to be good citizens. The Cubans
were also, however, concerned with the costs of the
system and its ability to adapt to political and ideo-
logical shifts.9'
Although the Cuban Popular Tribunals served a
temporary and transitional function, their impact is still
felt in Cuban society today precisely because of the
educational and community-building functions they served
during the crucial, early post-revolutionary period. Clearly,
when Popular Tribunals existed, they did not stem from
an "outsider jurisprudence" in the sense that the Cuban
citizens for whom they functioned were the dominant
class (and only class) in the new, post-revolutionary
society. The "outsiders," by virtue of the revolution, had
become the "insiders." The parallels are nonetheless
relevant to applying "outsider jurisprudence" in the U.S.
today, because in the global sense, Cuba was and is an
86. Id. at 1354.
87. Luis Salas, The Emergence and Decline of the Cuban
Popular Tribunals, 17 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 587 (1983).
88. Id. at 593.
89. Id. at 610. Salas notes that now Cuban judges wear dark
robes and other regalia, and other functionaries wear suits,
rather than work clothes. The trials are now held in court-
rooms, rather than public storefronts, plazas, or work centers.
Yet the modem system, "while rejecting the form of the popu-
lar tribunal, still aspires to many of its goals," particularly that
of community education.
90. Id. at 600-601.
91. Id.
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Moreover, it is significant that post-revolutionary
Cuba chose the legal process as a key forum for popular
education, a forum in which socialization by the courts
The Cuban Popular Tribunals served
many of the functions of legal storytell-
ing. They helped to transform popular
culture, to build community, to empower
a previously disempowered citizenry, to
educate the populace, and to build soli-
darity among the people.
and "[t]ransformation of bourgeois cultural patterns was a
core goal". 2 For perhaps, as has been suggested, this
radical experiment in socialist legality was only possible
during the earliest years of the revolution, "when the pri-
mary goals were destruction of the old and survival of the
new."93 Once the revolution entered the stabilizing stage
of the early 1970s, these transformative qualities were no
longer primary or even necessary. Fidel Castro's reflec-
tions on the tensions of this historical development mirrors
the premises of "outsider jurisprudence" expressed by
Mari Matsuda, noted earlier in this article:
In this revolutionary process there is a paradox char-
acterized in the first phase by iconoclasticism in
relation to laws . . . We now have two truths: the
first is that capitalist legality must be destroyed and
the second is that we must establish a socialist le-
gality. And to us revolutionaries corresponds this
dual role of abolishers of laws in one phase of the
revolution and creators and defenders in another
phase of the revolution. And this is in agreement
with another law: the dialectic of history.94
Although the Cuban Popular Tribunals eventually de-
clined in response to changed social conditions, they
served many of the functions of legal storytelling outlined
by Delgado. The tribunals helped to transform popular
culture, to build community, to empower a previously
disempowered citizenry, to educate the populace, and to
build solidarity among the people. They instilled a value
system that was different from the (previously) dominant
one, while actually administering popular justice. They
helped to transform Cuban society, by utilizing the judicial
system as a vehicle and mechanism for social change. As
a positive example of legal storytelling and the use of
alternative "legal" forums for popular education and com-
92. Id. at 603.
93. Luis Salas, The Judicial System of Postrevolutionary
Cuba, 8 NOVA L.J. at 69 (cited in note 77).
94. Id. at 69 (quoting from speech by Fidel Castro on the
Tenth Anniversary of the founding of the Ministry of Interior,
Verde Olivo, June 13, 1971 at 63).
munity-building, the Cuban Popular Tribunals provide
significant lessons to this day.
Nicaragua's Popular Tribunals
After the 1979 Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua,
the new government passed the Fundamental Law, which
repealed the old U.S.-backed Somoza regime's constitu-
tion. By decree, the new law created Tribunals Especiales
(Special Tribunals). These extra-judicial tribunals, fueled
by revolutionary activity, lingering turmoil, and popular
concerns for a new social order, were used to judge more
than 6,000 former National Guard soldiers and other per-
sons connected with the notorious Somoza government.95
These special tribunals were set up outside of the ordinary
court system, and were largely modeled after the Cuban
Popular Tribunals. These tribunals also served a "mani-
festly political function [as they] provided a popular forum
in which to expose by open trial the much publicized
crimes of the Somoza era." 96 After completing their task
of administering "revolutionary justice," these special tri-
bunals were abolished in 1981.9'
In a move that created intense controversy and
debate in the international legal and diplomatic
communities, the popular tribunals were reinstated in mid-
1983, in the form of the Popular Anti-Somocista
Tribunals, or TPAs, in response to the intensifying Contra
war. They were needed in order to judge suspected
counter-revolutionaries, during the State of Emergency
created by the renewed war. Critics of the tribunals
claimed that they lacked independence from political
forces and sufficient insulation from executive power, as
the TPA judges were selected by the Nicaraguan President
for an indeterminate term.98 The Nicaraguan government
answered that the increased intensity of the Contra war
necessitated an "agile" juridical alternative to the regular
courts, "capable of rapidly processing the increasing
number of cases related to the Contra war." 99
95. Robert Steinberg, Judicial Independence in States of
Emergency: Lessons from Nicaragua's Popular Anti-Somocista
Tribunals, 18 COLuM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 359, 360 (1987).
The original name of these courts is, in Spanish, Tribunales
Populares Anti-Somocistas, or TPAs. The TPA system consisted
of trial and appellate courts, both of which had national juris-
diction. They were created under the Public Order Law, as
emergency courts, to exercise jurisdiction over alleged crimes
by members of the Somoza regime against the Nicaraguan
people.
96. Id. at 372.
97. Id. at 377. At the time of the dissolution of the Special
Tribunals, the Nicaraguan government decided to grant uncon-
ditional release to the Somocistas still awaiting trial.
98. Id. at 379. According to Steinberg, two of the three
judges on each TPA panel were lay members. Typically, they
were selected primarily on the basis of their leadership in the
local Sandinista Defense Committees (CDSs), which are com-
munity based organizations affiliated with the government
party, modeled after the Cuban Committees for the Defense of
the Revolution (CDRs). The Cuban CDRs played a similar role
in the judicial selection to the early Popular Tribunals. For
more on the Nicaraguan community defense organizations, see
Building Democracy Through Mass Organizations, Central
American Bulletin, Nov. 1984, at 7-10, reprinted in NICARA-
OUA, UNFNISHED REVOLUTION 351-354 (P. Rosset & J.
Vandermeer eds. 1986).
99. Id. at 378. The decree establishing the tribunals stated
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This controversy was heightened when the popular
tribunal, rather than the ordinary criminal justice system,
was used in the trial and conviction of Eugene Hasenfus.
Hasenfus, a U.S. citizen, was shot down over Nicaragua
in October, 1986, while flying a Contra supply plane. He
was the first American taken prisoner in the conflict with
the U.S.-backed Contras. The Nicaraguan government
made an explicit decision to try Hasenfus in the extra-
judicial forum, rather than through the ordinary criminal
Through legal storytelling and resort to
explicitly extra-judicial forums, the Nica-
raguan people and government brought
their pleas for justice and claims against
the Contras to the world.
system. After being convicted of terrorism and violation
of public security laws, Hasenfus was sentenced to a 30-
year prison term on November 15, 1986. After one month
in prison, Hasenfus was pardoned in a widely publicized
action by Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega. He was
then allowed to return to the U.S."°
During the trial, dozens of victims of the Contra war
told their stories, chronicling the human cost of the U.S.-
backed atrocities. Before it was all over, the public trial
of Hasenfus, telecast throughout Nicaragua and around the
world, did more to spread the word about Contra terror
than perhaps any other single event.
Critics of the TPAs have focused on the alleged
built-in bias of the pro-Sandinista judges, their lack of
judicial independence, and the claim that TPAs have been
used to thwart political opposition of the government. Yet,
the nature of the role played by the TPAs has in fact
related primarily to the Contra war, and not to silencing
political dissent.' 0' Therefore, while a primary rationale
for the special tribunals was "agility," that is, an immedi-
ate need in time of crisis to bypass the backlog in the ju-
dicial system, the popular tribunals, as exemplified by
Hasenfus' trial, also clearly served another purpose, that
of popular education. This purpose was consistent with
Professor Delgado's analysis of "outgroup stories" and le-
gal storytelling.
The TPAs, and specifically the trial of Hasenfus,
that this "exceptional situation requires agile judicial organs of
temporary character which operate during the state of emergen-
cy to judge and punish those responsible for these crimes
against humanity." (quoting TPA Judge Omar Cortes in the
Boston Globe, Aug. 26, 1984, at 1, 4, col. 2).
100. Steinberg, 18 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. at 359 (cited
in note 95).
161. Id. at 383. In fact, Steinberg reported that few cases
"before the TPAs involve incidents of legitimate political pro-
test or opposition. Most of the TPA defendants are accused of
providing assistance . . . to the contras." Most of the relevant
human rights reports and U.S. media reports fail to "discuss,
empirically or on any other basis, the question of political
defendants before the TPAs."
popularized a critique of the Contra war among
Nicaraguans and throughout the international community.
Through legal storytelling and resort to explicitly extra-
judicial forums, the Nicaraguan people and government
brought their pleas for justice and claims against the
Contras to the world.
Furthermore, while the TPAs were formally
dismantled with the signing of the Arias Peace Plan,0 2
certain aspects of the extra-judicial tribunals may have a
lasting effect on the regular Nicaraguan legal system.
Specifically, the idea of "popular participation" has,
according to Steinberg, "received continuous and vehement
support"'0 3 from Nicaraguan leaders, as has the selection
process and use of lay judges. Finally, it is noteworthy
that the American Bar Association officially protested,
through a "Rule of Law" letter, the use of the Popular
Anti-Somocista Tribunal in the Hasenfus case."°
Popular Tribunals in Support of U.S. Political Prison-
ers
Finally, we consider the case of legal storytelling and
popular tribunals in the struggles to achieve justice for
political prisoners in the United States. Domestic human
rights violations have increasingly received international
attention over the last decade. Perhaps nothing has
brought this more into focus than the issue of political
prisoners in this country.
' °
0
102. Id. at 416-417. Despite the criticism of the TPAs for
their claimed lack of independence, the TPAs were ultimately
abolished for different reasons, when in August 1987, Nicara-
gua joined Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica
in signing the Central American Peace Agreement, known as
the Arias Plan. Among its provisions, the agreement called for
all states involved to abolish states of emergency and to re-
store the normal rule of law. Accordingly, Nicaragua lifted its
state of emergency and dismantled the TPAs. Pending TPA
cases were referred to the ordinary courts for further dispo-
sition.
103. Id. at 394-395 note 176. Steinberg states that "the Spe-
cial Tribunals may have been regarded as the first success for
the new ideal of popular justice in Nicaragua. Several years
ago, the Justice Ministry began a pilot project, testing a new
judicial system composed primarily of lay judges .... Minis-
ter Borge exhorted the First Judicial Congress: 'We have to
fight to bring about, in the short term, popular justice, to
incorporate the wisdom of the masses in the administration of
justice . . . '"(quoting from Borge, Justice In Nicaragua is No
Longer The Same, in NICARAGUA: THE SANDINISTA PEOPLE'S
REVOLUTION 264 (1985)).
104. Quoted in the ABA Journal of March 1, 1987, Michael
Posner, as chairman of the International Human Rights Com-
mittee of the Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities,
had written on behalf of the ABA:
Far from being judicial courts, they are administra-
tive tribunals that are subject to the Ministry of Justice
and are composed of . . . militants or supporters of the
Sandinista National Liberation Front, in other words, the
political enemies of the accused . . . . As a result, their
impartiality, fairness, and independence of judgment are
seriously compromised.
105. Political prisoners are those prisoners who are imprisoned
because of their acts, associations, or beliefs in support of
social justice, human rights or for national liberation. There are
well over 100 such prisoners in U.S. prisons, some incarcerat-
ed since the 1960s. They include leaders of the Black libera-
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While the U.S. government has consistently denied
the existence of political prisoners in the U.S., a growing
domestic support movement, as well as the international
human rights community, has continued to press its con-
cerns on the issue."° The United Nations and other in-
ternational legal and human rights organizations have
established minimum standards and criteria for the treat-
ment of all prisoners, and also specifically for political
prisoners."° These covenants condemn the use of political
beliefs and associations as a basis for harsher treatment
and torture. The U.S. government has at times used these
standards to condemn other countries for their policies
towards political dissidents.' Yet the U.S. government
hypocritically denies that it has the same problem of hu-
man rights violations.
While the U.S. projects itself as the guardian of hu-
man rights worldwide, it stands charged with the violation
of internationally protected rights, against many held in its
own prisons." It is therefore politically expedient for
tion struggle; the Puerto Rican independence movement; the
struggle for Native American sovereignty; Irish Republicans;
Plowshares religious anti-nuclear activists; Sanctuary workers in
support of the refugees of Central America; grand jury resist-
ers; North American anti-imperialists; draft resisters; solidarity
activists jailed for acts of civil disobedience, among others.
For more current information on the struggle to free po-
litical prisoners and POWs in the U.S. see the articles in this
issue, Yale J. of L. and Liberation, by Dhoruba Bin Wahad,
Julio Rosado and Yvonne Bushyhead. See also: Michael E.
Deutsch & Jan Susler, Political Prisoners in the United States:
The Hidden Reality, paper presented December 7, 1989, Hunter
College Conference on Human Rights; CAN'T JAIL THE SPIRIT,
POLITICAL PRISONERS IN THE U.S.: A COLLECTION OF BIOORA-
PHIES (El Coqui ed. 1989); XIV NEW STUDIES ON THE LEFT,
Nos. 1&2 (THE PRISON ISSUE) (VanderWall & Churchill eds.
1989).
106. See, for example, Amnesty International, THE HIGH
SECURITY UNIT, LEXINGTON FEDERAL PRISON, KY (August,
1988); Dr. Luis Nieves-Falcon, Criminalization and Persecution
of Opponents to the Colonial Status of Puerto Rico: Human
Rights Violations, paper presented December 7, 1989, Hunter
College, Human Rights Conference.
107. For the relevant international laws, see the 1949 Geneva
Conventions on Prisoners of War; the Geneva Protocols of
1977 (to the 1949 Geneva Convention) (6 U.S.T. 3316,
T.I.A.S. No. 3364); the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, Article 9; the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights, Article 9 (999 U.N.T.S. 171, 1969); the Amer-
ican Convention on Human Rights, Article 9; the United Na-
tions Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, and the United Nations
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.
108. See, for example, The Washington Post, July 25, 1990,
Al, 16 (U.S. condemns the holding of dissidents in Cuban
prisons).
109. For charges that the U.S. government is in violation of
international laws concerning the detention of political prison-
ers, see: Leonard Peltier: Native American Prisoner of War in
CAN'T JAIL THE SPIRIT (cited in note 105); Mutulu Shakur et
al., Prisoners of War: The Legal Standing of Members of
National Liberation Movements in NEW STUDIES ON THE LEFT:
THE PRISON ISSUE at 116 (cited in note 105); Statement of Dr.
Luis Nieves Falcon to Conference on Human Rights (cited in
note 106); Amnesty International, 1989 Report; Indictment,
"Before the Special International Tribunal On The Situation Of
Political Prisoners And Prisoners of War Held in United States
Prisons and Jails", Jan Susler, Esq., and Lennox Hinds, Esq.,
for the Petitioners, Political Prisoners and Prisoners of War in
the U.S. to take the position of denial and silence on the
question of its own political prisoners. By officially deny-
ing the existence of political prisoners, the U.S. govern-
ment can escape recognition of the larger injustices in
U.S. society, as well as the existence of the movements
for social change, from which the prisoners come."'
By officially denying the existence of po-
litical prisoners, the U.S. government can
escape recognition of the larger injustices
in U.S. society, as well as the existence
of the movements for social change from
which the prisoners come.
The issue of justice for political prisoners in the U.S,
by its very nature, has no forum, and no channels for
recognition and validation within the formal and estab-
lished U.S. legal system. Political prisoners, and their
families, friends, loved ones, and supporters are truly "ex-
cluded voices." By the very nature of political repression
and of prison isolation, theirs are voices which have been
deliberately silenced, and which the government has a
stake in keeping silenced.
The struggles for human rights and justice for politi-
cal prisoners, including freedom from imprisonment, an
end to isolation, and an end to particularly harsh
conditions of confinement has not, for the most part,
taken place within the courts. This struggle for justice has
necessarily taken place among the prisoners' communities,
families and supporters, and as such it is a jurisprudence
of outsiders.
Popular tribunals have been a particularly useful
form in achieving some meaningful level of justice in this
struggle. The combined popular-legal campaign to shut
down the control unit for women political prisoners at the
Lexington Federal Correctional Institution in Kentucky,
opened in October, 1986, is a case in point."' The
the United States (unpublished 1990).
110. Many of the same claims can be made on behalf of all
prisoners in the U.S. There is certainly valid debate about
whether or not all those incarcerated within U.S. prisons are in
fact "political prisoners". For purposes of this paper, the term
"political prisoners" is not meant to be exclusionary. Certainly
it can be argued that all prisoners are silenced voices, expe-
rience isolation, harsh conditions, and separation from their
communities, and that they constitute an underclass of society.
It is also a valid claim that the very existence of many pris-
oners is a reflection of the social injustices, economic dispari-
ties, and racial problems of this country. However, the issue of
"political prisoners", defined here as self-conscious, self-identi-
fied political activists, has some separate integrity, as well.
Special attention has recently been given to political prisoners
largely because of the international focus, the concurrent ex-
pose of U.S. foreign and domestic policies which the issue
raises, and the blatant denial of their existence by the govern-
ment. For more on prison conditions in general, and political
prisoners in particular, see NEW STUDIES ON THE LEFT: THE
PRISON ISSUE (cited in note 105).
Ill. For more on the Lexington Control Unit, see, Jan
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Lexington Control Unit was essentially a behavior modifi-
cation unit in which the Bureau of Prisons used sensory
deprivation, extreme isolation, and sexual degradation to
try to break the psyches of the women imprisoned there.
The government's "mission" was to exert total dominance
and control over the prisoners, and to ultimately break
their spirits and reduce them to a state of submission. The
first women sent to Lexington included Alejandrina
Torres, a Puerto Rican activist and Prisoner of War, Susan
Rosenberg, a North American anti-imperialist political
prisoner, and Silvia Baraldini, an Italian national who had
been imprisoned for her activities in the U.S. left move-
ment.
These women prisoners were told that the only way
they could leave this isolation unit and re-enter the gener-
al population was to renounce their radical politics and
associations. Critics of the Lexington control unit also
contended that the underlying strategy of the government,
the Justice Department, and its Bureau of Prisons was to
have the unit serve as a chilling example to other activ-
ists." 2
Bureau of Prisons officials stated that the conditions
of isolation and control in the unit were necessary in
order to provide adequate "security" for women who were
escape-prone, that is, those whose confinement "raises a
serious threat of external assault for the purpose of aiding
the offender's escape."" 3 The criteria for incarceration
in the unit were also explicitly political. In response to
Congressional and human rights organizations' inquiries,
Bureau of Prisons Director, J. Michael Quinlan, stated that
"[A] prisoner's past or present affiliation, association or
membership in an organization which ... attempts to
disrupt or overthrow the government of the U.S." was
also a criterion for placement in the unit."
4
A broad coalition of activists from the Puerto Rican
Independence Movement, church groups, civil liberties and
prisoners' rights attorneys, prisoners' rights activists, Am-
nesty International, and human rights, medical, educational
and psychiatric professional organizations, as well as the
women's and gay rights movements, and other grass-roots
Susler, Women's High Security Unit, 1 YALE JOURNAL OF
LAW AND LIBERATION 31 (1989); Through the Wire (Film,
producer Nina Rosenbloom 1989); Amnesty International, THE
HIGH SECURITY UNIT, LEXINGTON FEDERAL PRISON, KY
(August 1988); ACLU National Prison Project, "Report on the
High Security Unit for Women, Federal Correctional Institution,
Lexington, Kentucky" (1987); Richard Korn, The Effects of
Confinement in HSU: A Follow-Up, 15 Soc. JUST. 25 (Spring
1988); Mary K. O'Melveny, U.S. Political Prisons: Lexington
Prison High Security Unit, XIV NEW STUDIES ON THE LEFT
37 (1989); Susan Rosenberg, Reflections on Being Buried
Alive, XIV NEW STUDIES ON THE LEFT 40 (1989); "Report of
Visit by General Board of Global Ministries Team to High
Security Unit for Women, Federal Correctional Institution,
Lexington, Kentucky," (October 15, 1987).
112. See, generally, National Campaign to Shut Down the
Lexington Womens Control Unit, Buried Alive (Brochure,
1986); Through the Wire (Film, producer Nina Rosenbloom
1989).
113. Memorandum from G.L. Ingram, BOP Assistant Director
to BOP Regional Directors (September 2, 1986).
114. Letter from BOP Director J. Michael Quinlan to Con-
gressman Robert W. Kastenmeier (September 30, 1987).
community groups, joined forces to protest the existence
of the unit.
A focus of the coalition's early work was a People's
Tribunal to Expose the Crimes of the Lexington and
Marion Control Units, held in October 1987. "' The Tri-
bunal received national attention in the media and among
human rights, legal, and social activists, as well as within
church organizations. Speakers at the Tribunal included
parents, children and other family members of the prison-
ers, activists in the coalition, ex-prisoners, church mem-
bers, and other community members. Attorneys for prison-
ers confined in the control units gave testimony on behalf
of their clients. They also described their personal experi-
ences visiting the units, and shared their beliefs that the
units violated human rights standards under international
law and the U.S. Constitution. A panel of eight "people's
justices" heard testimony from over 27 witnesses. At the
completion of the tribunal, they found the U.S. govern-
ment and the control units guilty of human rights viola-
tions.'16
Compelled by stories shared at the Tribunal, by a
growing sense of empathy and common purpose, and by a
popular and collective notion of justice, those gathered
formulated further plans for a national media and grass-
roots campaign to shut the unit down. The Tribunal, as
the campaign's centerpiece, was so effective that it
sparked an international campaign of support for the pris-
oners. Consequently, international human rights activists
and the press in the Soviet Union raised the question of
political prisoners in the United States. Days before the
May, 1988 U.S.-Soviet Summit Meeting in Moscow, press
reports were filled with reports about United States po-
litical prisoners. Perhaps most importantly, it was widely
reported that Mikhail Gorbachev was incensed at United
States charges of Soviet human rights violations on the
eve of the Summit. Gorbachev, and the Soviet media,
called on President Ronald Reagan to examine his own
violations against United States political prisoners, and
specifically the human rights violations then taking place
at the Lexington control unit." 7
In March, 1988, several of the Lexington prisoners
filed a major civil rights action against the U.S. govern-
ment and the Bureau of Prisons, contending that their
First Amendment and Eighth Amendment rights had been
violated."' This litigation, undertaken collectively by the
115. For more on the Marion Control Unit, see, Douglas
Spaulding, End the Marion Lockdown, XIV NEW STUDIES ON
THE LEFT 20 (1989); J. Michael Olivero & James B. Roberts,
Marion Federal Penitentiary and the 22 Month Lockdown: The
Crisis Continues, CRIME AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, No. 27 & 28
(1987); Amnesty International, ALLEGATIONS OF ILL-TREAT-
MENT IN MARION PRISON, ILLINOIS, U.S.A. (May 1987).
116. See, Douglas Spaulding, End the Marion Lockdown, XIV
NEW STUDIES ON THE LEFT 20, 28 (1989).
117. See, the following Soviet newspapers for May 27-29,
1988: Pravda, Trud,. Izvestia. See also, Reagan Cites Soviet
Rights Gains But Calls For More; Moscow Questions US.
Right To Judge, Los Angeles Times, May 28, 1988, at Al;
The Financial Times, May 28, 1988, at Al; UPI Moscow,
May 27, 1988; Violations Against U.S. Citizens Sent to Soviet
Union, UPI New York, May 26, 1988.
118. Baraldini v. Meese, 691 F.Supp. 432 (D.D.C. 1988),
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ACLU National Prison Project, the Center for Constitu-
tional Rights, and the women's private attorneys, was
itself generated by the momentum of the grassroots cam-
paign to shut down the control unit. In July, 1988, federal
Judge Barrington Parker ruled that the women's First
Amendment rights had been violated, and that they had
been persecuted for their political beliefs. He ordered that
the unit be immediately closed." 9 As a result, the U.S.
and the Bureau of Prisons were forced to close the
unit.' This legal victory was quite extraordinary. As a
member of the judiciary, or, in Fiss's words, the "inter-
pretive community," Judge Parker allowed the excluded
voices of the women prisoners to break through the wall
of silence. Judge Parker's decision expressed empathy for
these silenced voices in a time of reaction in the federal
courts; he criticized the government, while recognizing the
right of the women, as political prisoners, to express their
views. '
This temporary. legal victory was as much a direct
result of the campaign's work, and the persistence and
determination of the women prisoners to have their voices
be heard, as it was skillful litigation. The popular tribunal
was effectively utilized as a method to "spread the word"
and to empower the movement. As a result of this con-
certed effort, the issue not only gained international no-
tice, but achieved significant recognition in the U.S. courts
as well. This case shows that when excluded voices of
those who are deliberately silenced begin to be heard in
alternative, popular forums, then even the formal legal
system and its jurists may have to listen and adjust their
relationship to the issue.
As a next step in the continuing struggle for recogni-
tion and proper treatment of political prisoners in the
rev'd sub norn Baraldini v. Thornburgh, 884 F.2d 615 (D.C.
Cir. 1989).
119. Baraldini v. Meese, 691 F.Supp. at 439. However, the
effects of the BOP "mission" continue. For example, after
Silvia Baraldini's medical complaints had been ignored for
months, she was found to be suffering from a rare form of
uterine cancer. After two operations and radiation treatment,
Silvia now awaits expatriation from Marianna Prison to her
native Italy. Under the terms of an international treaty, the
Strasbourg Convention, a citizen of one country who is
imprisioned in another country is allowed to return to her
native land to finish her sentence. A campaign in support of
Silvia Baraldini, waged in the U.S. and Italy, is currently
pressing the U.S. government to abide by the terms of the
Strasbourg Convention, to which it is a signator. See, Council
of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons,
codified in the United States at 18 U.S.C. § 4100 et seq.
120. Since then, the U.S. won a reversal of this opinion on
appeal to the D.C. Circuit. See, Baraldini v. Thornburgh, 884
F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In reversing Judge Parker, the
Circuit held that the Bureau of Prisons was free to consider a
prisoner's politics when making decisions about their treatment
and placement.. Nevertheless, the Lexington control unit has not
been re-opened. A new and considerably larger "maximum
security" prison for women was opened in Marianna, Florida
in August 1988. Women prisoners, both political and non-polit-
ical have been sent there. The conditions at Marianna are
being monitored by the Lexington lawsuit lawyers and women
prisoners. Although the conditions are not those of Lexington's
small control group isolation, there is a higher level of control
at Marianna than at any other federal women's prison.
121. Baraldini, 691 F.Supp. at 439.
U.S., a special International Tribunal on human rights vio-
lations against U.S. political prisoners was held on De-
cember 7-10, 1990, in New York City.' This tribunal
utilized an approach very similar to the other popular
tribunals discussed in this article.
The purpose of the Tribunal was to bring to the
attention of the international community and the American
people the reality of political prisoners, and the continued
violation of their human and civil rights. This is clearly
an issue that has virtually no forum in the official courts
of this country. In a criminal indictment to the special tri-
bunal, nearly one hundred political prisoners charged the
U.S. government, the Justice Department, the CIA, FBI
and the Bureau of Prisons, with violating laws of interna-
tional human rights, as well as the U.S. Constitution. Af-
ter receiving extensive written and oral evidence from
witnesses testifying in support of the indictment, the dis-
tinguished panel of jurists deliberated and found that,
under international law, there are political prisoners and




Are popular tribunals, as illustrated in these
examples, law? Do they produce law? Or, as a form of
legal storytelling, do they simply help to mediate the
tension between justice and order, by humanizing the law?
In this way, does legal storytelling of this quasi-legal, yet
informal, type, become part of the law or does it remain a
critique of the law? I have attempted to show one way
that legal storytelling, the narrative voice, and the move-
ment for "outsider jurisprudence" can go beyond the aca-
demic context and serve meaningful, concrete, and politi-
cal functions. In this way, legal storytelling and popular
tribunals contribute to transforming the normative systems
surrounding the law, the legal system, and perhaps most
importantly, those of us who practice in the law.
For indeed there is a value in popular notions of jus-
tice, as shown in these examples, precisely because law is
essentially political, rather than an abstraction. My sug-
gestion has been that this popular notion revives the com-
pelling nature of Owen Fiss's optimistic commitment to
the law as an ideal which embodies the values of justice,
equality, and true social peace. For the issue is not Fiss's
122. A panel of eight internationally recognized jurists lis-
tened to testimony that substantiated the indictment. The
panel's decision will be distributed to members of Congress
and of the United Nations, as well as to international and
domestic human rights organizations. The decision will be the
basis for continued organizing efforts. This tribunal emerges
from a long and significant history of international tribunals,
beginning with the Nuremberg trials. These bodies have doc-
umented, investigated and condemned war crimes, human rights
abuses and racist policies in countries around the world. See,
Julio Rosado, Political Prisoners in the United States: The
Puerto Rican Charade, in this issue of YALE J. OF L. AND
LIBERATiON at 43.
123. For a detailed report of the Tribunal's findings and ver-
dict, see "Special International Tribunal on the Violation of
Human Rights of Political Prisoners and Prisoners of War in
United States Prisons and Jails" (Dec. 10, 1990), reprinted,
this issue of the YALE J. OF L. AND LiBERATION at 47.
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idealism, nor for that matter the radical visions of
people's lawyers of the 1960s. The issue is our own col-
lective need and responsibility to increase our levels of
empathy for, and solidarity with, the silenced voices of to-
day.
As we begin to listen to the excluded voices, support
them, and even become part of the struggle to have them
be heard, then perhaps some members of the "interpretive
community" will also begin to be challenged. We must be
moved to listen. In so doing, we may contribute to reviv-
ing the value and potential of the law itself, by using the
law as a vehicle for social change, thus giving substance
to the struggle for social justice.
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